Federal budget cuts could end critical safety investigations into refinery fires and chemical disasters, raising global risks.
When fire erupted at the Intercontinental Terminals Co. bulk liquid petroleum storage terminal, large plumes of dark smoke billowed into the clear skies over Deer Park, Texas. Despite the efforts of site staff and local firefighters, more than 70 million gallons of petroleum products burned or were otherwise released into the environment over the following three days in March 2019.
Even while the fire was still burning, investigations began looking into what had happened and what was still happening. The Environmental Protection Agency tested air and water samples to determine how much pollution was being released – both to determine cleanup efforts and to assess fines. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration reviewed what had happened, but found that with no workers injured, there was no reason to investigate further or impose fines or other penalties on the company.
A third federal agency, the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, often known as the CSB, got to work figuring out what had gone wrong, without assigning legal or financial responsibility, but rather seeking to learn from this disaster how to prevent future accidents. It’s an approach much like the National Transportation Safety Board takes toward airplane crashes, train derailments and other transportation-related tragedies: document what happened and identify every opportunity to prevent or reduce the chances of it happening again.
That deep investigative process reportedly will not happen in the wake of the October 2025 explosion and fire at a Chevron refinery in El Segundo, California, because of the federal government shutdown and lack of funding for the organization.
As scholars of chemical disasters, we believe this absence – and the potential for the board to be eliminated entirely under the proposed 2026 federal budget – raises the risk of more, and more serious, chemical disasters, not just in the U.S. but around the world.
Many serious incidents
The CSB investigation of that 2019 fire that burned 15 petroleum tanks at the Intercontinental Terminals Co., near the Port of Houston, yielded key recommendations to the company, OSHA and the EPA. They included necessary updates to safety management systems, the need for flammable-gas detectors to identify leaks, and remotely operated emergency shutoff valves so workers could close tanks containing hazardous material without exposing themselves to danger. The company has addressed the first recommendation and is reportedly working on the next two.
The board also recommended to the petroleum industry that storage tanks be spaced farther apart so they would be less likely to catch each other on fire – a recommendation that is still under review.
And the Texas fire was just one of several disasters the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board investigated that year. Since its activation in 1998, the board has conducted in-depth investigations of 102 chemical disasters in the chemical and industrial sectors – an average of about four per year. And its reports are regularly used worldwide, including in France, South Korea and China.A U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board video summarizes the agency’s findings about a March 2019 petrochemical terminal fire in Texas.
Creation and goals of the CSB
The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board was created by Congress in a 1990 amendment to the Clean Air Act, in the wake of several high-profile chemical disasters around the world.
Those included the 1976 dioxin release in Seveso, Italy, which caused skin lesions on over 600 people and contaminated nearly 7 square miles of land; the deaths of thousands in Bhopal, India, from the 1984 release of methyl isocyanate from a Union Carbide pesticide plant; and the Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster in 1986 in what was then the Soviet Union. The goal was to prevent similar accidents from occurring on U.S. soil by investigating the causes of incidents and providing recommendations for improvement.
Specifically designed to be independent of other organizations and political influence, the CSB cannot be forced to modify its findings by other agencies, branches or political parties, ensuring its impartiality.
It has no power to issue regulations, nor any authority to impose fines or other punishments for wrongdoing. Rather, it is a fact-finding, investigative body designed to learn from past disasters and issue voluntary recommendations so chemical companies can improve their equipment and processes to prevent future tragedies. The vast majority of its recommendations are adopted by the industries affected, usually by the investigated company, though sometimes recommendations become industry standards. These recommendations can range from changes in procedure, the addition of safety devices or even overall facility design recommendations.
